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Recent Developments

Romer v. Evans

I

n a controversial six to three
decision, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996),
held that "Amendment 2," a proposed amendment to the Colorado
state constitution, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The
Court found no legitimate state
interest advanced by an amendment which denied homosexuals
the pursuit of legal protections
afforded to other groups. In so
holding, the Court rejected morally
based legislation burdening a particular class and created an uncertain future for legislation based on
moral ideals.
In 1992, rolorado's state constitution was amended as the result
of a statewide referendum. The
impetus for the referendum stemmed from numerous municipal
ordinances banning discrimination in areas such as housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services. Amendment 2
repealed these ordinances to the
extent that they prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. In its explicit terms, Amendment 2 prohibited all legislative,
executive and judicial action designed to protect homosexuals or
bisexuals.
Shortly following its adoption,
litigation to invalidate Amendment
2 began. In the District Court for
the County of Denver, plaintiffs,
many of whom were homosexual,
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argued that the enforcement of
Amendment 2 would subject them
to the immediate risk of discrimination. The court granted a preliminary injunction and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of
Colorado.
Colorado's highest
court sustained the injunction and
remanded the case for further consideration, holding that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of
review and finding that Amendment 2 infringed the fundamental
right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process.
On remand, the district court
found that the State failed to show
that Amendment 2 had been narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. The
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the district court and the
Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari to decide
whether Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court began its analysis by

declaring as "implausible" the
State's argument that Amendment
2 merely places gays and lesbians
in the same position as all other
persons. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1624. Pointing to the findings of
the Colorado Supreme Court, the
Court found that, since Amendment 2 repealed existing statutes
and regulations barring discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the "ultimate effect" of Amendment 2 was to limit all governmental bodies from adopting similarly
protective measures "unless the
state constitution is first amended
to permit such measures." Id. at
1625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)). Homosexuals, according to the Court,
were thus deprived of previously
enjoyed legal protection from discriminatory injuries, and any hopes
of the reinstatement of those
protections would be quashed. Id.
The Court acknowledged that
the Fourteenth Amendment does
not grant Congress the power to
prohibit discrimination in places of
public accommodations. Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)). For this reason, Colorado, like most other states, has
enacted its own statutes to prevent
such discrimination. Id. Such
statutes often provide a broad
definition of public accommodation which includes "hotels,
restaurants, ... insurance agencies,
and 'shops and stores dealing with
goods or services of any kind. '"
ld. (quoting Denver Rev. Munici27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 43
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pal Code, Art. IV, § 28-92).
In admonishing the effect of
Amendment 2, the Court pointed
out that not only were homosexuals barred from the protections of
public accommodation laws, but
legislation that had been enacted to
stem discrimination against homosexuals was repealed. Id. at 1626.
For instance, a certain Colorado
executive order which "forbids
employment discrimination against
all state employees ... on the basis
of sexual orientation," would have
been repealed. Id. (citing Exec.
Order No. D0035, 3 C.F.R.
(1990)).
According to the Court, the
promise of equal protection of the
laws must co-exist with the practical reality that most laws inevitably classify one group, resulting in
a possible disadvantage to one or
more other groups. Id. at 1627
(citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass.
v. Fenney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
Therefore, if the legislation neither
burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, it would be
upheld as long as it bears a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. (citing Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993)).
According to the majority,
Amendment 2 failed even this very
deferential rational review test. Id.
at 1627. The Court found that
Amendment 2 imposed a "broad
and undifferentiated" burden on
homosexuals simply because the
group is politically unpopular, and
further, by its far reaching implications, could only be a result of
"animus" toward the targeted class
- homosexuals. Id. at 1628. For

27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 44

these reasons, the Court strongly
rejected the notion that Amendment 2 satisfied a legitimate governmental interest and any rationale for it was equally nonexistent. Id. The Court summarized that it considered Amendment 2 to be simply a status based
infringement on homosexuals'
rights devoid of any "relationship
to legitimate state interests," and
as such, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1629.
Justice Scalia, in a somewhat
acerbic dissent, challenged the
majority's decision from several
perspectives. First, he found distasteful the majority's creation of
the principle of law that a person
or group is denied equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment
when they, in order to gain an advantage, are required to seek a
more difficult avenue of recourse
than others. Id. at 1630.
Assuming that Amendment 2,
in fact, disadvantaged homosexuals instead of merely refusing to
bestow special privileges upon
them, the dissent next questioned
how actions which disadvantage a
group for conduct ruled criminal in
many states could possibly be a
violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 1631-32. Justice
Scalia asserted that "[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a State
to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to enact
other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct." Id. at 1631
(citing the Court's approval of
such laws in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).

Next, Justice Scalia attacked
the majority opinion by analogizing homosexuality to polygamy. He pointed out that several
states were required to permanently prohibit polygamy in order
to be granted statehood, thus
targeting polygamists for disfavored status. Id. at 1635. The
majority would, therefore, suggest
that the "perceived social harm of
polygamy is a 'legitimate concern
of government,' and the perceived
social harm of homosexuality is
not." Id. at 1636.
Finally, Justice Scalia took
issue with the Court's position in
what he perceived as the "culture
wars." Id. at 1637. He stated that
Amendment 2 was conceived to
stay the decay of sexual morality
and was sanctioned by a majority
of Colorado residents. By striking
it down, according to Justice
Scalia, the Court acted out of "political will" as opposed to "judicial
judgment." Id.
As a result of the decision in
Romer v. Evans, groups that engage in a lifestyle that is apparently considered unacceptable
by a majority of voters, yet possess
a large and influential political
lobby, will not be denied protections against discrimination
which are in excess of those bestowed upon everyone else. The
Court has declared that a duly enacted referendum to a state constitution, which denies special protections to homosexuals based on
their sexual orientation, is invalid.
It is apparent that the Court is
attempting to protect a class which
is largely unpopular. In the future,
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however, courts will be free to
strike down what they perceive as
politically incorrect legislation
regardless of its position with
respect to moral ideals. The Court
is of the opinion that there can be
no legitimate governmental in-

terest advanced by legislation
which promotes the moral and
religious attitudes of the constituency but also burdens an unpopular class. It would be interesting to see if the Court would be

of the same opinion if confronted
with an equally passionate constitutional challenge to legislation
which similarly burdens such
morally distasteful groups such as
prostitutes and polygamists.
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